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Articles

THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
By: Michael P. Seng*
Whenever a state or federal law touches upon the subject of
religion there is the possibility of conflict with the First Amendment.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the government from establishing religion and from interfering with
the free exercise of religion.' Both the Fair Housing Act and the
1996 Welfare Reform Act raise delicate issues relating to the
establishment and free exercise of religion in the private and public
housing markets.
The Fair Housing Act,2 passed by Congress after the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, and amended by
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, prohibits housing
discrimination on the basis of religion. 3 The Act makes it illegal for a
housing provider, public or private, to discriminate in the sale or
rental of housing or in the provision of housing services on the basis
of religion. 4 The Act contains a very limited exemption for religious
organizations.'
The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 contains a charitable choice
provision that authorizes federal and state governments to provide
religious organizations with direct monetary grants for social services
on the same basis as any other private organization.6 The Charitable
Choice provision of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, which was
introduced in Congress by Senator John Ashcroft and signed into
* Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. The author would like
to thank John Marshall Clinical Professor Joseph Butler for his advice and input on the
relationship between the First Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. He would also like to
thank John Marshall law student Terri Tinder for her research assistance.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2000) (It also prohibits discrimination on the basis or race,
color, national origin, sex, handicap, and familial status. State and local laws and ordinances
sometimes expand these protected classifications.)
3. Id § 3604.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(c).
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law by President William Clinton, began what under the George W.
Bush Administration became known as the "Faith-Based Initiatives"
program.7 This program allows religious organizations to participate
in government subsidy programs on an equal basis with secular
organizations. The Act does not specifically define a religious
organization; instead, it provides that a religious organization retains
"its independence from Federal, State, or local governments,
including such organization's control over the definition,
It
development, practice, and expression of its religious beliefs."'
further provides that, "[n]either the Federal Government nor a State
shall require a religious organization to - (A) alter its form of
internal governance; or (B) remove religious art, icons, scripture, or
other symbols. . .. " Under the Act, a religious organization may
not refuse to serve persons on the basis of their religion or their
refusal to participate in religious practice."
The Federal Fair Housing Act's broad prohibition on religious
discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision
of housing services applies to housing that is faith-based." For
7. 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2000).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(l).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(2).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(g).
11. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§3604-3606 (2000). A dwelling is defined as "any
building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for
occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for
sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion
thereof." United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F.Supp. 544, 548-49 (W.D. Va. 1975).
The definition includes congregate as well as individual dwellings. The Act clearly applies to
senior housing, assisted housing, and nursing homes, as dwellings for many seniors or persons
with disabilities. Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1102 (3d Cir. 1996).
Providing safe and affordable housing for seniors is a matter of growing public policy
concern, and while there are presently only a few cases that involve discrimination in senior
housing, more claims will inevitably arise. The New York Times has reported that most
seniors prefer to live in homes where they can be with persons of similar backgrounds and
interests and that housing providers are building communities to meet these needs. Hilary
Apelman, All Your Neighbors Are Just Like You, N.Y. Times, April 13, 2004, at El. This is
understandable, but it also presents greater opportunities for providers of senior housing to
discriminate in violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act.
The Fair Housing Act clearly prohibits discrimination in senior housing on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin in senior housing. 42
U.S.C. § 3604. The exemption in the Fair Housing Act for "housing for older persons," only
allows these projects to exclude children under 18 years of age, which otherwise would be
forbidden under the familial status provisions of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1). Senior
housing is not exempt from any of the other anti-discrimination provisions of the Act.
Many senior projects are faith-based, and therefore, questions can arise about the role
of religion in these facilities. Many seniors find great solace in religion, and religion often takes
a prominent role in their lives. Consequently, the right of elderly persons to the free exercise of
religion is important, especially when they are disabled or otherwise in need of assistance, so
that they can fulfill their religious obligations.
However, the First Amendment forbids the government from promoting religion.
Whenever the government provides assistance to faith-based senior housing projects there is a
concern that the government should not go too far and breach the wall of separation between
church and state.
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example, the Act's prohibition on the publication of any notices,
statements, or advertisements with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination
based on religion' 2 undoubtedly affects the way many faith-based
projects can be promoted to the public.
On the other hand, the Fair Housing Act exempts dwellings
owned or operated by religious organizations from some of the
prohibitions in the Act. 3 Thus, the Act attempts to walk the delicate
boundary between not favoring religion and not disadvantaging
religion.
Early in his presidency, George W. Bush attempted to expand
the application of the Charitable Choice provisions of the Act.' 4
Although he was unsuccessful with Congress, President Bush
published a series of executive orders that expanded Faith-Based
Initiatives.' 5 Traditionally government funding had been available to
groups, such as Catholic Charities, that operated as independent
Section 501(c)(3) organizations. 6 The Charitable Choice provisions
of the Act and the Bush executive orders generally make government
funds more available to faith-based religious organizations,' 7 and
consequently they raise important concerns under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
The 1996 Act did not apply directly to federal housing
programs, and an attempt to extend the Charitable Choice
provisions to housing assistance was defeated in 2001." However, in
2004 the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) adopted regulations to implement the President's FaithBased Initiatives in all HUD programs.' 9 The regulations make
possible equal participation of religious organizations in HUD
programs and activities by prohibiting discrimination against an
organization on the basis of the organization's religious character or
12. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a). This section allows "a religious organization, association,
or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or
in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society" to limit "the sale, rental or
occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to
persons of the same religion" and allows such an organization to give "preference to such
persons, unless membership in such religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national
origin."
14. See, Community Solutions Act, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201(c)(4) (2001).
15. See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 29, 2001); Exec. Order
13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001); and Exec. Order 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec.
12, 2002).
16. David M. Ackerman, Public Aid to Faith-BasedOrganizations(Charitable Choice)
in the 107th Congress: Background and Selected Legal Issues, Congressional Research Service
Report for Congress, order code RL31043, at 7 (Aug. 19, 2003)
17. See generally, www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbcilguidancelcharitable.html
18. H.R. 7
19. See Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations, 69 Fed. Register 41,712
(July 9, 2004) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.109).
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affiliation.20
The regulations prohibit the organization from
engaging in "inherently religious activities" when participating in any
activities funded by HUD." "Inherently religious activities" include
worship, religious instruction, or proselytism.22 This prohibition is
tempered by the qualification that these "inherently religious
activities" may be offered separately, "in time or location," from the
programs, activities, or services supported by HUD funds, and
participation in these activities must be voluntary for the
beneficiaries of the program. 3
HUD regulations, like all administrative actions, must comply
with federal legislative and constitutional mandates; thus, the HUD
regulations regarding Faith-Based Initiatives specifically provide that
an organization's participation in HUD programs and activities must
comply with applicable federal fair housing and nondiscrimination
requirements.24 Furthermore, in administering HUD programs, the
Secretary (as well as all other executive departments and agencies)
has a Congressional mandate under the Fair Housing Act
"affirmatively to further" fair housing.25
As drafted, neither the Fair Housing Act nor the Faith-Based
Initiatives Program appears to violate the First Amendment.
However, both statutes require careful application so as not to
disrupt the careful balance required by the First Amendment.
I.

THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

A.

RELIGION AS A PROTECTED CLASS

Religion is a protected class under the Fair Housing Act, and
housing providers are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of
religion with regard to any housing units covered by the Act.26
Remarkably, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
it does not believe there has been a recent history of pervasive
religious discrimination proven by the States.2 7 Regardless of the
20. Id.
21. 24 C.F.R. § 5.109(c).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Supra note 21 at 41,713.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (2000). The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the
duty "affirmatively to further" fair housing means that the HUD Secretary, when
administering programs, has "an obligation to assess negatively those aspects of a proposed
course of action that would further limit the supply of genuinely open housing and to assess
positively those aspects of a proposed course of action that would increase that supply."
Darst-Webbe Tenant Assoc. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 339 F.3d 702, 713 (8th Cir. 2003).
See also Dean v. Martinez, 336 F.Supp.2d 477 (D. Md. 2004).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
27. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1997) (held that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was unconstitutional as applied to the states under section 5 of the
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validity of this assertion, there is no question that there is a long

history of religious discrimination in the private housing market.
The most notable example was the prevalence of restrictive
covenants in certain residential areas against Jewish people.28

Though prevalent, religious discrimination has not generated a large
number of cases under the Fair Housing Act. 29 However, such cases
may arise in the future. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
and the resulting "War on Terrorism" have focused attention on
Arab-Americans and Muslims and could realistically result in
increased housing discrimination against these persons because of

their religion.
Because religious affiliation is a protected class, requiring a
religious test to occupy a housing unit would violate the Fair
Housing Act. Unless the dwelling is exempt from the Act, a religious
organization cannot treat members of its faith preferentially,3" just as
a white housing provider cannot favor a white applicant, or a
Chinese American cannot favor another Chinese American. The Act

Fourteenth Amendment, finding that Congress did not have sufficient evidence of recent
instances of state discrimination on the basis of religious practice). It is doubtful that this
reasoning would prevail in an attack against the Fair Housing Act, which is grounded on both
section 5 and the Commerce Clause and applies to private action as well as public action.
No challenges based on Boerne have been made to the prohibition of religious
discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. However, in Groome Resources Ltd. v. Parish of
Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 205-16 (5th Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals held that Congress had
the power to eliminate handicap discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, and in Seniors
Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1034 (1 1th Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals held
that Congress had the power to eliminate familial status discrimination. Both cases found that
housing discrimination, on the basis of familial status and handicap, has a substantial effect on
commerce. Groome Resources Ltd., 234 F.3d at 207-08; Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, 965 F.2d
at 1034. The same reasoning could be applied to religious discrimination as well.
The legislative history of the 1968 Fair Housing Act is not helpful in construing the
provisions prohibiting religious discrimination. See Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A
Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969); Schwemm Housing
Discrimination: Law and Litigation (Updated 2004), §§ 5:2 - 5:4. The religious provisions were
not further addressed in the 1988 Amendments Act, which added the protected classes of
handicap and familial status. See Michael P. Seng, Discrimination Against Families With
Children and HandicappedPersons Under the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 22
JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 541 (1989).

28. See, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS - THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 68-69 (1947). Judicial enforcement of these covenants
that discriminate in violation of the 14 thAmendment was prohibited by the United States
Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
29. Part of this may be because discrimination against Jews and Muslims and other
religious groups is often characterized as "racial" or "national origin" discrimination under the
civil rights laws. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (discrimination
against Jews is a form of racial discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1866); Saint
Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (discrimination against Arabs is a form of
racial discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1866). However, religious discrimination as
such will not violate the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In Bachman v. St. Monica's Congregation,
902 F.2d 1259, 1261-62 (7th Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals held that discrimination against
non-Catholics was not, in and of itself, discrimination on the basis of race even though a
Jewish couple was denied the housing.
30. See generally42 U.S.C. §3604.
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may also be violated if there is discrimination in the terms or
conditions of occupancy or in the provision of services or facilities.3"
Inquiring about someone's religion under circumstances where
it appears that religion may be relevant to the occupancy of the unit
or the nature of the services available may similarly violate the Act.32
a municipal zoning
In LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher,33
ordinance forbade private homes from being used to conduct
religious services. Orthodox Jews claimed that the law discriminated
against them and that the law was enacted, at least in part, to keep
them out of the village.34 On appeal, the Court held that the evidence
and the law supported a jury verdict against the village.35 This case
supports the argument that a rule that discriminates on the basis of
religion because it purposefully singles out religion for special
treatment is illegal.36 LeBlanc-Sternberg also supports an argument
that facially neutral rules that have a disparate impact upon those
who want to practice their religion would be illegal under the Fair
Housing Act unless the housing provider could justify it with some
religiously neutral reason, regardless of whether a reasonable
accommodation3 7 for religious practices is required. 38
31. Id. at subsection (b).
32. But see Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Center, 617 F. Supp. 977, 984 (D.
Colo. 1985), affd, 815 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1987), which held that inquiries about religious
affiliation were simply to allow the housing provider to notify the tenant's clergyman in case of
an emergency and not for purposes of discriminating in the admissions process. However, a
landlord is obviously on slippery ground when asking such questions.
33. 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995).
34. Id. at 416.
35. Id The Leblanc decision raises a number of questions. For instance, the Court of
Appeals mentions that religious discrimination can be established either by showing a
discriminatory intent or a discriminatory impact. See generally, Fletcher, 67 F.3d at 426.
Under the facts of the case, there was probably more than enough evidence for the jury to find
a discriminatory intent. A finding that an ordinance is illegal on an intent theory is obviously
much easier to sustain on an appeal than a finding that it is illegal under an impact theory. See
Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996) (impact must be established
by a policy or practice and not by a mere incidence of discrimination). Also, the Village had
previously allowed home worship and then passed an ordinance against it. How much that
sequence of events may have influenced the jury is not disclosed.
36. Id. See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 534-40 (1993) (holding that an ordinance that prohibited animal sacrifices was not neutral
because it prohibited only slaughtering for the purpose of religious practices).
37. See discussion of reasonable accommodations infra Part I D.
38. Although the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, lower courts have held that
policies or practices that have a disparate impact against a protected class may violate the Fair
Housing Act. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978);
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988), aff d
per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). While continuing to adhere to the disparate impact standard,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has questioned whether the standard is
appropriate in a racial steering case, Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1529 (7th
Cir. 1990), and, without deciding the question, in insurance redlining cases. NAACP v.
American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 978 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 907 (1993).
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A rule that required housing residents to attend religious
services appears to directly affect the terms and conditions of
occupancy in violation of section 3604(b).
While there are no
reported cases on point, sometimes such rules of dubious legality
have been imposed by providers of homeless shelters. 39 The new
HUD regulations concerning faith-based organizations forbid
recipients of federal moneys from requiring residents to participate in
these programs.4 n
If a housing provider serves meals, must the provider
accommodate the special dietary needs imposed by a particular
resident's religious practices? It can be argued that this is a service
that is provided to residents as part of the housing and that the effect
of the non-accommodation is to send a message that persons of
different religions are not welcome. The housing provider would
argue that it treats everyone the same and has no independent
responsibility to accommodate the needs of each resident by serving
meals. 4'
Nonetheless, by volunteering to serve meals, the housing
provider offers a service that is covered under the Fair Housing
42
Act.
Questions can arise about the right of residents to display
religious symbols. Obviously a rule that specifically prohibited the
display of religious pictures or icons would discriminate on the basis
of religion and violate the Fair Housing Act. 43 However, a rule of
general applicability that was passed in response to specific
complaints about the display of religious symbols or under
circumstances where the only symbols displayed were religious,
should also be found to discriminate on the basis of religion. For
example, if a condominium association pass a rule prohibiting the
display of signs or symbols of any kind and a resident desires to
display a mezuzah, which is required by Jewish custom, the rule

39. See, e.g., Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (N.D. 111.1995) (homeless
shelter for battered women who are looking for permanent housing is a dwelling).
40. See, 24 C.F.R. § 5.109(c).
41. In HUD v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Reno, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen)
26,286 (H.U.D. A.L.J. June 19, 2002), a HUD Administrative Law Judge held that a housing
authority was not required to accommodate a disabled tenant by considering his purchase of
restaurant meals as a medical expense in calculating his rental contribution. The tenant argued
that it was dangerous for him to cook and therefore he had to eat all his meals outside the unit.
Id. at 26,287-88. This case involved a request to pay for meals outside the housing complex
and does not involve a housing provider that offers meals as part of the housing "package." Id.
at 26,288-89. The judge found that a reasonable accommodation was not necessary to afford
him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his apartment. Id. at 26,291-93.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
43. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 53440 (1993) (the Court invalidated a city ordinance that specifically targeted a religious practice
under the First Amendment. The Fair Housing Act would similarly invalidate a private
housing rule that was neither "neutral" nor "of general applicability").
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should be illegal under the reasoning of LeBlanc-Sternberg if there is

no independent religiously neutral reason that would justify the rule.
Additionally, religion is a protected classification for a person
that is "institutionalized" in state housing, such as a senior who
resides in a nursing home or care center, under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). 4
RLUIPA adopts the definition of "institution" used in the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act.4 5 The Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act 46 defines the term "institution" to

mean:
"any facility or institution - (A) which is owned, operated, or
managed by, or provides services on behalf of any State or
political subdivision of a State; and (B) which is - (i) for
persons who are mentally ill, disabled, or retarded, or
chronically ill or handicapped . . . or (v) providing skilled
nursing, intermediate or long-term care, or custodial or

residential care.

47

Whether residents of a state-run nursing home or care facility are
considered "institutionalized" under the RLUIPA, so that they can
seek the higher level of protection, will largely depend upon whether

the facts satisfy the definition.
B.

ADVERTISING AND SECTION 3604(c)

Section 3604(c) makes it unlawful
to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect
to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000). The United States Supreme Court has sustained the
constitutionality of the Act over the objection that it is an impermissible accommodation that
violates the First Amendment. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2128 (2005).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2000).
47. 42 U.S.C.§1997(l).
"Privately owned and operated facilities are not deemed "institutions" if -- "(A) the
licensing of such facility by the State constitutes the sole nexus between such facility and such
State; (B) the receipt by such facility, on behalf of persons residing in such facility, of payments
under title XVI, XVIII, or under a State plan approved under title XIX, of the Social Security
Act [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381 et seq., §§ 1395 et seq., or §§ 1396 et seq.], constitutes the sole nexus
between such facility and such State; or (C) the licensing of such facility by the State, and the
receipt by such facility, on behalf of persons residing in such facility, of payments under title
XVI, XVIII, or under a state plan approved under title XIX, of the Social Security Act [42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1381 et seq., §§ 1395 et seq., or §§ 1396 et seq.], constitutes the sole nexus between
such facility and such State." 42 U.S.C. § 1997(2).
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handicap, familial status, or national origin or an intention to
make such preference, limitation or discrimination."48
HUD has adopted a nuanced approach to the application of this
section.
Many faith-based housing complexes are religiously owned or
sponsored and convey that sponsorship in their names:
The
Lutheran Home for the Aged, the Masonic Home, or Saint Anne's
Hospice. Many people might assume that the names of these homes,
even though the homes may be open to all, nominally indicate a
preference for persons of that faith or creed. HUD's new FaithBased Initiatives directive specifically provides that religiously
affiliated organizations that receive federal funding may retain
religious terms in their organization's name and in their mission
statements and other governing documents.49
However, under the Fair Housing Act, advertising should not
contain an explicit preference, limitation, or discrimination because
of religion.
For example, a real estate company's excessive use of
Christian images and slogans in its real estate advertising may
convey a message of exclusion. 1 HUD has advised that advertising
containing a religious reference or symbol will not automatically
violate 3604(c), if it is accompanied by a disclaimer that the home is
open to all without discrimination. 2 Also, advertisements that state
that the complex contains a chapel or that kosher meals are available
do not on their face discriminate or violate the Act.5 3 Regardless of
whether these distinctions made by HUD make sense in light of the
overall policies of the Fair Housing Act, there can be no doubt that
they reflect current practices in the market place; and it is unlikely
that a court would find that HUD was acting unreasonably in
refusing to find that such practices violate the Fair Housing Act.
The display of religious symbols by faith-based organizations
may present special problems under the Fair Housing Act. The new
HUD faith-based initiatives directive specifically states that religious
organizations need not remove religious art, icons, scriptures or
other religious symbols from spaces where services are provided
using HUD funding. 4 Having a crucifix or a Star of David in the
lobby or a picture of the Last Supper in the dinning room would not
48. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
49. 5 C.F.R. § 5.109(d).
50. Supra note 42.
51. See, Lotz Realty Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 717 F.2d 929, 930 (4th Cir. 1983).
52. See, Achtenberg, FHEO Guidance Regarding Advertisements under Section
804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen) 5365, 5366 (Fair Hous. and
Equal Opportunity Jan. 9, 1995).
53. Id
54. 5 C.F.R. § 5.109(d).
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seem in and of itself to send an exclusionary message. However,
whether such symbols violate the Fair Housing Act will depend upon
the total context of the display and the effect that the display would
have on the average person.5 5 If the symbols are pervasive and
would make a reasonable person of a different religion feel unwanted
or uncomfortable, they may act as a deterrent to persons who are not
of the same faith and could, in these circumstances, violate the Fair
Housing Act.
C.

The Exemptions

The Fair Housing Act attempts to accommodate religious
bodies by giving them a limited exemption. Section 3607(a) states:
"Nothing in this title shall prohibit a religious organization,
association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or
organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in
conjunction with a religious organization, association, or
society, from limiting the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings
which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose
to persons of the same religion, or from giving preference to
is restricted
such persons, unless membership in such religion
56
origin.
national
or
color,
race,
of
account
on
There are very few reported cases where this exemption has
been raised. As with any exception to a general regulatory scheme,
Congress intended that the exemption be read narrowly in light of
the overreaching purpose of the Act to prohibit discrimination
against protected classes.57 The language of the exemption is also
narrow. It applies to the "sale, rental, or occupancy of dwellings" or
giving "preference" to persons of the same religion. By its terms, it
does not cover other practices prohibited by the Fair Housing Act.
Section 3607(a) does not apply to properties owned and
operated by religious organizations, associations or societies for
commercial purposes.58 This limitation on the exemption makes it
inapplicable to many religiously owned or operated properties
because most housing owned or operated by religious organizations
will be operated for a commercial purpose. The Act does not define
what a commercial purpose is. Clearly a church can restrict who
55. See Ragin v. The New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (human
model advertisements that would convey a preference to the ordinary observer violate the Fair
Housing Act).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a).
57. United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 882 (3d Cir. 1990). The
legislative history is not helpful in interpreting the religious exemption to the Fair Housing Act.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a).

2005]

The Fair Housing Act and Religious Freedom

occupies a rectory or manse or allow only nuns or monks to reside in
a convent or monastery. However, once a religious organization
decides to sell or rent homes to lay persons, it must not restrict the
sales or leases only to members of the religion of the organization.
The religious exemption will not apply if there is discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 59 This limitation is in
accordance with the government's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination.6" In United States v. Hughes Memorial Home,6" a
private home for children was held not to be exempt under the Act
because it discriminated on the basis of race, and not religion. The
exemption does not explicitly refer to discrimination on the basis of
sex, handicap, or familial status.62 Therefore, a question could be
raised whether religious organizations can discriminate on a basis
other than race, color, or national origin. However, section 3607(a)
only exempts religious organizations' preferential treatment of
members of their religion. It does not exempt religious organizations
that discriminate on a basis other than religion. Because the Fair
Housing Act prohibits discrimination based on sex, handicap, or
familial status generally,63 because exemptions are to be narrowly
construed, 64 and because Congress has not articulated a sound policy
reason that would allow religious organizations to discriminate on
the basis of sex, handicap or familial status, this type of
discrimination by religious organizations should be illegal under the
Act.
The leading case addressing the question of what constitutes a
"religious organization" under section 3607(a) is United States v.
Columbus Country Club.65
The Knights of Columbus, a Roman
Catholic organization, formed the Columbus Country Club as a notfor-profit organization in 1920, but no longer had any legal
relationship with it.66 The Club maintained summer homes on a 23acre tract on the Delaware River.67 Members of the Club were
required to be Roman Catholics and to be recommended by their
parish priest.68 Although the Club had no formal affiliation with the
59. Id.
60. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) (race):
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987)
(gender).
61. 396 F.Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975).
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
64. Supra note 61 at 882.
65. 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990). See Claudia J. Reed, Note, Housing Law - United
States v. Columbus Country Club: How "Religious" Does an Organization Have to Be to
Qualify for the Fair Housing Act's Religious Organization Exemption?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L.

REV. 61, 86
66.
67.
68.

(1993).
Id.at 878-79.
Id. at 879.
Id.
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Roman Catholic Church, weekly celebration of the mass was
conducted on the Club property and some members of the Club
gathered at the Chapel every evening to say the rosary.69 A statue of
the Virgin Mary was located near the entrance to the Club.7"
The District Court found and the parties agreed that the Club
itself was not a "religious organization,"'" but the Club maintained
that it was "operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction
with" a religious organization. 72 The Court of Appeals held that the
Church's grant of the privilege of having weekly mass on the Club
grounds and its tacit approval of the recital of the rosary was not
sufficient to show that it was operated in conjunction with a religious
organization. 73 The appellate court defined "operated in conjunction
with" to require:
[A] mutual relationship between the non-profit society and a
religious organization. The existence of this relationship
cannot depend solely on the activities of the non-profit
organization nor be viewed only from its perspective. Indeed,
evidence of the club's unilateral activities would go to whether
it is itself a religious organization not to whether it is operated
'in conjunction with' a religious organization. Furthermore,
the Church's ability to withdraw permission to hold mass and
the fact that on one occasion it may have indirectly influenced
the club's Board of Governors by threatening to do so are not
enough. Without further evidence of interaction or
involvement by the Church, we cannot conclude that as a
matter of law, the Church controlled the defendant or that the
defendant was operated 'in conjunction with' the Church.
Consequently, on this record and in light of our unwillingness
to read the statutory exemption broadly, we hold that the
defendant failed to carry its burden of proving its entitlement
of the religious organization exemption.7 4
The Court of Appeals used a parochial school as an example of
what might be considered an affiliated organization7 5 , citing

69. Id
70. Id
71. Id at 882.
72. Id
73. Id. at 883.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 882. The exemption for religious organizations under Title VII is somewhat
narrower than the exemption under the Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2002)
provides that:
"This subsection shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
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comments of Senator Walter Mondale, the Fair Housing Act's chief
sponsor:
There is an exemption to permit religious institutions or
schools, etc., affiliated with them, to give preference in housing
to persons of their own religion despite the Act.' 114 Cong.
Rec. 2273 (Feb. 6, 1968) (emphasis added).76
A dissenting opinion by Judge Mansmann argued that the
majority had unduly minimized the significant connections between
the Columbus Country Club and the Catholic Church.7" He argued
that a formal relationship was not required under a literal reading of
the statutory language.78 He saw the religious dimension of the Club
as substantial and not as mere subterfuge to evade the requirements

particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities."
Many of the cases interpreting section 2000e-l involve schools. In Killinger v. Samford
University, 113 F.3d 196, 199 (11 th Cir. 1997), a university was allowed to claim the exemption
because it was controlled in substantial part by and received over $4 million annually from the
state Baptist Convention. This amount was 7% of the University's budget and was the largest
single source of its funding. Similarly, in Hall v. Baptist Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 62425 (6th Cir. 2000), a nursing school was found to be covered by the exemption because it was
founded by a sectarian organization, had a religious mission, and was closely associated with
the Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee Baptist Conventions and their affiliated churches. In
EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools, 990 F.2d 458, 461 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993), the Court found that a
school was not exempt on the basis of religion because the school was primarily secular. The
Court observed:
"The Schools maintain a cooperative relationship with the Bishop Memorial
Church, which receives financial support from the Bishop Estate and is a member of
the Hawaii Conference of the United Church of Christ. However the Schools
themselves are not affiliated with the Church of Christ, and the parties stipulated
that no Protestant denomination, including the Church of Christ, 'owns, supports,
controls or manages, in whole or in part, the Bishop Estate or the Kamehameha
Schools.'
"In view of the narrow reach of the section 2000e-l exemption, it is not
surprising that we have found no case holding the exemption to be applicable where
the institution was not wholly or partially owned by a church ..
"
In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987), where the Supreme Court held that the exemption did not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the school in question was a
nonprofit facility, open to the public, run by the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the Corporation of the President of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, both of which were religious entities associated
with the Church, an unincorporated religious association.
The Courts have been somewhat more relaxed in applying the National Labor
Relations Act. In NLRB v. Bishop Ford Central Catholic High School, 623 F.2d 818, 823 (2d
Cir. 1980), the Court held that a religious mission was sufficient to justify preference of coreligionists even though the school was no longer affiliated with a religious organization.
76. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 882.
77. Id at 885.
78. Id.
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of the Fair Housing Act.79 He feared that subjecting the Club to the
Fair Housing Act would "destroy its character as a religious
community where like-minded individuals are able to support one
another, communally express their beliefs and model their values to
their children."8 Undoubtedly, the majority in Columbus Country
Club read section 3607(a) very narrowly, but in light of the fact that
the purpose of the Act is to eliminate religious discrimination, the
Court's decision would appear to be correct.
United States v. Lorantffy Care Center 8' presented a more
difficult question concerning the definition of a "religious
organization;" however, the Court found it unnecessary to provide
an answer. The case concerned a church-established care center for
elderly immigrants from Hungary.82 The care facility was found to
have violated the Fair Housing Act because it discriminated on the
basis of race and national origin and, therefore, could not claim the
exemption under the Fair Housing Act.83 Even if there had been no
record of racial discrimination, it is doubtful that the Lorantffy Care
Center would have qualified as a religious organization. A minister
with the support of his church's council and congregation established
the Center as an independent legal entity.84 The Church's members
gave money to the Center, and the Church and the Center shared
facilities and personnel.8 5 Church members were given priority to the
facility, and there was an agreement that if the Center were to cease
operations, all its assets were to go to the Church.86 Nonetheless,
residents paid for their housing as they would in any commercial
venture, and it was not readily apparent that removing the
discriminatory requirements that gave preference to Church
members would negatively impact anyone's practice of religion.87
Similarly, in Bachman v. St. Monica's Congregation,8' a suit
was filed for racial discrimination under the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
The Church sold the house to a Catholic couple not from the

79. Id.at 888.
80. Id. However, the defendants were unable to make a persuasive argument on
remand that opening the housing to outsiders adversely affected the practice of their religion in
any way. See United States v. Columbus Country Club, No. 87-8164, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16438 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1992).
81. 999 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
82. Id.at 1040.
83. Id.at 1044.
84. Id.at 1040.
85. Id
86. Id.at 1040-41.
87. See generally, Id.at 1041.
88. 902 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1990).
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parish. 9 A Jewish couple unsuccessfully claimed discrimination on
the basis of race.9" The Court stated that it was an open question
whether, had the case been filed for religious discrimination under
the Fair Housing Act, the property would have been entitled to the
3607(a) exemption. 91 However, given the commercial nature of the
transaction and the fact that it was an outright sale, one would not
have expected the defendants to prevail had they raised this issue.
Based on these precedents, it appears that most housing
operated by religious organizations will not be able to claim the
religious exemption in 3607(a). The housing itself will not be a
"religious organization." And because usually the housing will have
only loose ties to a church, it will not be able to show that it is
operated "in conjunction" with a religious organization.
D.
No DUTY TO PROVIDE A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
FOR RELIGION

The Fair Housing Act requires housing providers to make
reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities.92 No
similar requirement exists for persons with religious needs.93 Thus, a
faith-based complex that serves meals but does not meet the religious
requirements of a tenant, or institutes a neutral rule that prohibits
the consumption of alcohol on the premises and is interpreted to
preclude the use of wine at a Catholic mass on the premises, would
not have to yield to accommodate the religious beliefs or practices of
tenants, unless there is independent proof of discrimination on the
basis of religion in the provision of these services.94
89. Id. at 1260.
90. Id.
91. Id.at 1261.
92. 42 U.S.C.§3604(0(3).
93. In this respect, the Fair Housing Act differs from Title Vii, which was amended in
1972 to provide:
"The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
In EEOC v. Townley Eng'g and Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988), the Court of
Appeals held that an employer must excuse employees from devotional services held once a
week during work hours under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
94. See Hack v. President and Fellows of Yale College, 16 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Conn.
1998), affd, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000) (college had no duty under the Fair Housing Act to
accommodate the religious beliefs of students who objected to living in co-educational dorms).
In his partial dissent in the Court of Appeals, Judge Moran distinguished the Fair Housing Act
from Title VII which requires employers to accommodate the religious practices of their
employees and the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act that requires housing providers
to accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities. 237 F.3d at 103-04. Nonetheless, Judge
Moran unsuccessfully argued that even though there was no duty to accommodate religion, the
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Nonetheless, if the request for a reasonable accommodation
were related to the special needs of disabled persons95 in the complex,
a discrimination claim should be successful if the accommodation
does not pose an undue cost or administrative burden and is
necessary for the person to use or enjoy the dwelling and not merely
a preference.9 6

Thus if a person with a disability needs to be accommodated by
having a ramp built to a Chapel in the complex, has a dietary need
associated with her disability, or cannot attend regular church
services and needs to hold a religious service in her unit, a housing
provider cannot refuse this request without establishing that it would
be administratively or financially burdensome.97
Orthodox Jewish students had stated a cause of action because the facially neutral Yale policy
that required undergraduate students to live in co-educational residence halls had a
discriminatory impact on their religion. Id. at 92. The majority opinion rejected the impact
argument on the ground that the students had made no claim that the Yale policy would result
in the under-representation of Orthodox Jews in Yale housing. 237 F.3d at 90-91. The
majority opinion also made the dubious observation that because the students were seeking
exclusion from housing and not inclusion, they did not state a claim under the Fair Housing
Act. 237 F.3d at 90.
95. The Fair Housing Act broadly defines the term handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).
"Handicap" means a person who:
I. has "a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities";
2.
has "a record of having such an impairment"; or
3.
is "regarded as having such an impairment .. "
The Act not only covers persons with disabilities but also anyone associated with them, such as
family members or caregivers. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(C).
The Act does allow a housing provider to deny a unit to any person whose tenancy
would pose a "direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would
result in substantial physical damage to the property of others." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(9).
However, a "direct threat" must be established by "objective evidence of overt acts that caused
harm, or acts which directly threaten harm." Wirtz Realty Corp. v. Freund, 721 N.E.2d 589,
597 (I11.App. Ct. 1999). But see, Key Youth Servs. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1276
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the denial of a special use permit to a group home for troubled
youth where some of the youth suffered from mental impairments did not give rise to a fair
housing violation where it was shown that the city denied the request because of public safety
concerns).
The same definition is contained in the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 705(8)(B),
and in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
In employment cases, the Supreme Court has held that a person whose impairment can
be corrected by medication or corrective devices is not handicapped. Sutton v. United Airlines,
527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (ADA); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999)
(ADA). These cases also hold that a disability must have a major impact on the person's
ability to perform activities that are of "central importance to daily life." These cases have not
been of concern in most housing discrimination cases. Almost by definition, if a person with a
disability needs an accommodation to use or enjoy housing, the impact of the disability on the
person would necessarily be of "central importance" to that person's daily life. The
impairment must also be permanent or long-term. Toyota Motor Mfg., KY v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A).
97. See United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park, 29 F.3d 1413 (9th Cir. 1994)
(landlord must waive overnight guest fee to accommodate the needs of a disabled resident who
needed a care giver to sleep over); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995)
(condo association must move a disabled tenant to the head of the list for a parking space
needed to accommodate the tenant's disability); Green v. Housing Authority of Clackamas
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These requirements are not meant to accommodate the
religious needs of the tenant or unit owner but to accommodate that
person's disability so that the person can enjoy equal access to the
unit and the services connected with it.98
IL.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Section 3601 of the Fair Housing Act specifically provides
that the Act must be read in conformity with the Constitution.99
Therefore, all clauses in the Fair Housing Act must conform to the
requirements of the First Amendment.'0 0
A.

BURDENING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

1.
ACCOMMODATING
RESIDENTS

THE

RELIGIOUS

PRACTICES

OF

Government interference with the free exercise of religion
violates the First Amendment.' The HUD directive on Faith-Based
County, 994 F. Supp. 1253 (D. Ore. 1998) (management must waive no pet policy to
accommodate a person with a disability); Giebeler v. M & B Associates, 343 F.3d 1143 (9th
Cir. 2003) (apartment owner must accommodate a tenant's disability by allowing a cosigner on
the lease). In HUD v. Ocean Sands, Inc., 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen) 25,530 (H.U.D.
A.L.J. Sept. 3, 1993), a housing provider was found liable for refusing to allow a disabled
resident to install a wheelchair lift and walkways and make other minor changes in a unit.
98. Under the Fair Housing Act, municipalities cannot directly discriminate against
group homes for persons with disabilities. E.g., Alliance for Mentally Ill v. Naperville, 923 F.
Supp. 1057, 1078 (N.D. Il. 1996) (A municipality cannot impose fire code provisions aimed
specifically at homes for persons with disabilities if there are no special needs that justify
treating these homes differently.)
Municipalities may also have an affirmative duty to
accommodate homes for persons with disabilities when they are being excluded because of
zoning or other land use requirements. E.g., Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096
(3d Cir. 1996) (nursing home given zoning variance to locate in residential area); Smith & Lee
Assocs. v. Taylor, 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996) (group home for elderly disabled persons could
expand facility from six to twelve residents over city's objection that expansion was
inconsistent with single family character of neighborhood); Oconomowoc Residential
Programs Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2002) (group home for
developmentally disabled adults allowed a variance from an ordinance restricting group homes
from operating within 2,500 feet of another community living arrangement); Tsombanidis v.
West Haven Fire Department, 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003) (group home for recovering
alcoholics could operate in a single family neighborhood).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
100. The First Amendment, which protects the free exercise of religion, only applies if
there is governmental action. Therefore, while the Fair Housing Act itself must be read in
accordance with the Constitution, the acts of private housing providers will not normally
violate the First Amendment unless they are compelled or otherwise supported by
governmental action. Mere financial support received by a private nursing home will normally
not make the home a state actor to bring it under the First or Fourteenth Amendment. Blum
v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982) (private nursing home does not have to follow due
process restrictions when discharging or transferring a patient). See also the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(l)(A) and (2) (defining a "state institution").
101. See generally, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
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Initiatives provides that religiously affiliated organizations are
eligible to receive funding in their programs so long as the funds are
not used for "inherently religious activities," such as worship,
religious instruction, or proselytism.° 2
Under this rule, inherently religious activities must be offered
separately, in time or location, from the programs, activities, or
services supported by direct HUD funds and participation must be
voluntary by the beneficiaries of the programs." 3 The term "time or
location" is left undefined, but the HUD comments specify that
HUD believes separation on the basis of time and location is legally
unnecessary and would impose a harsh burden on small faith-based
organizations. °"
Nonetheless, if religious and state-sponsored
secular activities are not sufficiently separated, a violation of the
Establishment Cause of the First Amendment could be alleged.
Even apart from the provisions of the Fair Housing Act,
requiring a religious test for residency in any public housing unit
could not be justified under the United States Constitution. A more
difficult question is whether a public housing unit is required to make
exemptions in otherwise neutral regulations to accommodate the
religious practices of residents.
Employment Division v. Smith," 5 holds that a facially neutral
law will be judged under the rationality standard of review normally
employed by the Supreme Court in economic and social cases. Thus,
one could argue that a neutral regulation that infringes on a
resident's free exercise of religion will be upheld so long as it is
justified by a good reason.
However, the application of the
rationality standard to review facially neutral laws that restrict the
practice of religion has been widely criticized.0 6 Almost immediately

102. 5 C.F.R. § 5.109(c).
103. Id.
104. Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,716.
105. 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion, refused to follow
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the denial of unemployment benefits to a
woman who was fired because of her refusal to work on the Sabbath infringed on her First
Amendment rights) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (reversing the conviction of
parents who refused to comply with a state compulsory education law because of their religious
beliefs). Instead he relied on an older line of cases that applied minimal judicial scrutiny to free
exercise claims, including Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding a bigamy
conviction against a person of the Mormon faith); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); (holding that a child labor law could be applied to prevent a minor from distributing
religious literature); and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding a Sunday closing
law as applied to Orthodox Jews who did not work on the Sabbath).
106. Congress twice expressed its disapproval of the test: first, in the Religious
Freedom restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000bb (1993), and, after part of that Act was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, in the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000). Justice O'Connor called for the Court to overturn
the Smith opinion in her dissent in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546-548 (1997).
Similar pleas to reconsider Smith were made by Justices Souter (521 U.S. at 565) and Breyer
(521 U.S. at 566).
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after the Smith decision, Congress with overwhelming bi-partisan
support passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
which required laws that substantially burden the free exercise of
07
religion to be justified by a compelling governmental interest.1
The Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional as
applied to states and local governments in City of Boerne v. Flores. °0
The opinion is not the model of clarity. The Court held that
Congress had no power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to impose the RFRA against states and local
governments. However, Boerne did not directly address the issue of
the Act's constitutionality as applied to federal action, and lower
courts have applied RFRA when reviewing acts of the federal
government. 09
After the Supreme Court struck down RFRA, Congress passed
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA),"' which attempted to reinstate some of RFRA's
requirements on the states in cases involving land use or the rights of
institutionalized persons. Rather than relying on section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to pass the 2000 Act, as it had done in
passing RFRA, Congress relied on the Spending and Commerce
Clauses in Article 1, Section 8."' The Supreme Court has upheld
RLUIPA against a challenge that it violates the Establishment
2
Clause."l
If persons are in a state institution for the mentally ill, disabled,
retarded, chronically ill, or handicapped, or in skilled nursing,
intermediate or long-term care, or in a custodial or residential care
facility, RLUIPA protects them. The State must have a compelling
justification if it infringes upon their free exercise of religion." 3
Thus, a public housing project for "institutionalized" persons that
supplies meals to its residents may be required to accommodate the
special dietary needs imposed by a particular resident's religious
practices.'
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I et seq.
108. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
109. See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1219-21 (9th Cir. 2002); O'Bryan v.
Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003).
110. 42 U.S.C. §§2000cc-I et seq. (2000).
111. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2118.
112. Seeid at 2117.
113. Supra note I11.
114. A federal judge has ruled that the RLUIPA was violated when prison officials
refused to supply an inmate with a vegetarian diet based solely on his assertion that his
religious beliefs required the special diet. Agrawal v. Briley, 2004 WL 1977581 (N.D. Ill.
Aug.
25, 2004). The judge further held that the beliefs were protected even if they were not held by
all members of the same religious group, stating that: "RLUIPA addresses the imposition of'a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of aperson,' not a member of a religious group, and
Congress enacted RLUIPA in the context of Supreme Court decisions holding that the First
Amendment's free exercise clause protects an individual's right to follow his or her sincerely
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Some states have passed equivalents of RFRA, which they

presumably have the right to do under their own constitutions.115
For

instance,

Illinois

passed the

Illinois Religious

Freedom

Restoration Act that provides that the government may not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even through
rules of general application, without showing that it used the least
restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest." 6
These laws impose more stringent standards for reviewing state
interferences with religious practices than would be required under
the federal Constitution.
Apart from RFRA or a state equivalent, there seems to be no
independent basis under existing constitutional jurisprudence to
require a public housing authority or other public funding entity to
provide special assistance to enable residents to practice their
religion. Indeed the neutrality required in some state constitutions
toward religion may well justify a state's not making money available
to support religious activities.
In Locke v. Davey,"' the United States Supreme Court held
that a state that establishes a scholarship program to assist
academically gifted students with postsecondary school expenses
may exclude those students who are pursuing a degree in devotional
theology. The student argued that the exclusion violated the Court's
decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah"' because it was based on the state's hostility toward
religion. The Supreme Court rejected this inference and held that the
State was merely choosing not to fund a distinct category of
instruction." 9 The State of Washington had inserted in its state
constitution a specific prohibition against using tax funds to support
the ministry, a prohibition that was broader than required by the
held religious belief." Id.at *3.The judge rejected arguments that any burden imposed on the
inmate was justified by cost considerations or storage problems and concerns that providing
the extra fruits and vegetables that come with meatless meals would lead to the production of
more illicit alcohol. Id.at *9.She further rejected the idea that the special diet was so desirable
that it would encourage other inmates to make false claims of religious need. Id. at *10.
115. States may expand rights beyond the minimum protected by the United States
Constitution, so long as in doing so, they do not violate the rights of others. See Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980) (California extended the right of free speech
to a private shopping center). See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (Michigan
courts can expand the definition of an unreasonable search and seizure under state law, so long
as the decision is clearly independent of federal law).
116. 775 ILCS 35/15. What a "substantial burden on the free exercise of religion" is
has been narrowly construed. Diggs v. Snyder, 775 N.E.2d 40, 45 (111.
App. Ct. 2002), appeal
denied, 202 111.2d 601, 787 N.E.2d 156 ("To constitute a showing of a substantial burden on
religious practice, [the claimant] must demonstrate that the governmental action 'prevents him
from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience that his faith mandates."').
117. 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
118. 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (held that the city had intentionally singled out religion when
it penalized the ritual killing of animals).
119. Supra note 117 at 720-21.
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Federal Constitution.1 2 ' The Court found that far from evincing
hostility toward religion, the Washington laws and corresponding
programs permitted students to attend pervasively religious schools
and to take devotional theology courses.' 2' The restriction on paying
for devotional theology degrees was based on the distinction
embodied in the Washington Constitution that training for a
religious profession and training for a secular profession are not
122
fungible.
While the Federal Constitution may not require a state to
spend money in support of a religious activity as held in Davey, 123 a
state cannot discriminate against religion in those facilities it makes
generally available to the public. 24 For instance, if a publicly
supported complex has a meeting room that it regularly makes
available for private meetings, it cannot deny the facility to groups
25
who want to conduct religious meetings or services in the room. 1
2.

INVESTIGATING RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

The United States Supreme Court has held that the mere
investigation of a religious organization by a state Human Rights
agency to determine whether a violation of the law has occurred does
not pose an undue burden on the practice of religion.' 26 In Ohio Civil
Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 127 the Supreme
Court held that the mere investigation of a private religious school
for discharging an employee on the basis of gender does not violate
the First Amendment.
Although the decision was concerned
primarily with whether a federal court could enjoin the Commission
under Younger v. Harris12 8 abstention principles, the Court
commented that:
Even religious schools cannot claim to be wholly free from
some state regulation. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972).
We therefore think that however Dayton's
constitutional claim should be decided on the merits, the
Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely
investigating the circumstances of Hoskinson's discharge in this
120. Id.at 719, 722.
121. Id.at 724-25.
122. Id. at 721.
123. Id. at 725.
124. Good News Club v. Milford, 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (equal access to school
premises after school hours).
125. Id. at 113-120.
126. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
127. Id. at 628.
128. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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case, if only to ascertain whether the ascribed129religious-based
reason was in fact the reason for the discharge.
However, if the investigation is unduly intrusive into the
religious activities of the defendant or if it continues after the
investigator should have known that no violation of the Act
occurred, there could be a violation of the First Amendment. In
White v. Lee, 30 pursuant to the filing of a complaint by the developer
of a proposed group home, HUD investigators conducted a
prolonged investigation against neighbors who protested the
construction of the home. The neighbors had leafleted and filed
protests with the city council, as well as filed a lawsuit against the
home. '' The Court of Appeals held that the activities of the
neighbors were legitimate free speech and petition activities and that
the HUD investigators, by conducting an investigation long after
they should have realized that these activities were protected by the
First Amendment, could be held personally liable for damages in a
civil rights action.'32
Harassing persons because of their religious beliefs would
likewise be illegal and a civil rights violation.
3.

THE FAIR HOUSING EXEMPTION FOR RELIGION

A question might be raised whether the exemption in 3607(a) is
sufficiently broad, as interpreted by the Courts, to protect First
Amendment Rights.
This question was raised on remand in
Columbus Country Club, discussed in Part II C, above. The District
Court considered whether extending the protection of the Fair
Housing Act to a private club that wanted to restrict entrance to
members of the same religion violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. 33 The District Court rejected this argument,
finding that compliance with the Fair Housing Act imposed no
significant intrusion into the religious beliefs and practices of the
Catholic members of the Club.'34

If a rule or regulation is neutral on its face and does not single
out religious practices for special disadvantages, the Supreme Court
has said that it will be upheld so long as it is otherwise

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
17,098 (E.D.
134.

Supra note 127 at 628.
227 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1220-21.
Id. at 1238-40.
United States v. Columbus Country Club, 2 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen)
Pa. July 30, 1992).
Id. at 17.099.
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constitutional.'
Conversely, if the rule or regulation specifically
singles out religious practices and proscribes or otherwise restricts
them, there may be a violation of the First Amendment."3 A similar
result would occur if some other fundamental right such as free
speech or assembly were implicated.' 37
A recent case involving free exercise issues relevant to this
discussion is the California Supreme Court decision in Catholic
Charities v. Superior Court.'3 8 Catholic Charities was required by
California law to provide insurance which covered prescription
contraceptives for its employees if it provided insurance coverage for
other prescription drugs.'3 9 Catholic Charities raised a number of
state and federal objections."' California law exempted "religious
employers," but it was an undisputed fact that Catholic Charities
was not a "religious employer" as defined in the statute. 4 '
Catholic Charities first argued that the law interfered with
matters of religious doctrine and internal church governance, but the
Court held that the case did not implicate internal church
governance, only the relationship between a nonprofit public benefit
corporation and its employees, most of whom did not even belong to
the Catholic Church.'42 The Court also rejected Catholic Charities'
argument that the government could not properly distinguish
between secular and religious entities and activities.'4 3 Under the
circumstances of this case, the Court held that there was no inquiry
into the employer's religious purpose and its employees' and clients'
religious beliefs that would involve the government in an
entanglement with religion.'"
Catholic Charities also argued that the law was not neutral
because the practical effect of the law would reach only Catholic
employers. "' Even though the law was facially neutral, the Court
recognized that the context in which a law operates could destroy its
"neutrality."' 4 6 However, the Court found that while most religious
employers did not object to the contraception coverage, the
exception in the law was a justifiable accommodation to protect the

135. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
136. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-40
(1993).
137. In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990), Justice Scalia
referred to these cases as hybrid cases.
138. 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 53 (2004).
139. Id at 74.
140. Id. at 76.
141. Id.at ?
142. Id.at 77.
143. Id.at 80.
144. Id.at 80-81.
145. Id at 82.
146. Id.at 84.
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beliefs of Catholics.'47 That the exemption was not so broad as to
cover all organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church did not
mean that the law discriminated against the Catholic Church. 4 The
some Catholic employers differently from other
law simply 14treated
9
employers.
The California Supreme Court also rejected the argument that
the law implicated a hybrid right under Employment Division v.
Smith 5 °, finding that "Catholic Charities' compliance with a law
The California
regulating health care benefits [was] not speech.''
Supreme Court acknowledged that the California Constitution's
protection of the free exercise of religion might be more strict than
the federal standard announced by Justice Scalia in Smith. 52
However, the Court found that the state law did not in fact burden
Catholic Charities' religious beliefs; the conflict could be avoided
simply by not offering coverage for prescription drugs.'53 Even
assuming that there was a burden, the Court found that the State had
a compelling state interest in eliminating gender discrimination and
that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 5 4 The
United States Supreme Court has declined to review the decision of
the California Supreme Court.'
Although the issues in Catholic Charities were more broadly
framed, the resolution of that case is consistent with the narrower
arguments that were made under the exemptions to the Fair Housing
Act in United States v. Columbus Country Club.'56 Housing that is
used directly for religious activities is exempt; housing that generates
from other
indistinguishable
revenue and is otherwise
"commercially" operated properties is not exempt from the Act.
A more troublesome opinion is the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Boy Scouts v. Dale,'57 where it held that New
Jersey could not extend its public accommodations law to require the
Boy Scouts to reinstate a homosexual as an assistant scoutmaster.
The Boy Scouts argued that New Jersey's decision requiring the Boy
Scouts to reinstate the complainant violated the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment right to free expression.'58

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 85.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 89,
Id.
at 89-91.
at91,
Id.
Id.at 93-94.
Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 125 S.Ct. 53 (2004).
2 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen) 17,098 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992).
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
at 644.
Id.
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The Supreme Court held that the determination depends upon
'
whether the group engages in "expressive association."159
The
association need not be an advocacy group so long as it engages in
some form of expression.16
The Court found that the general
161
mission of the Boy Scouts was "to instill values in young people."
As such, the Boy Scouts convinced a majority of the Justices that
homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the Boy Scouts' message
of "clean living" and that a homosexual
would not provide a
162
desirable role model for the Scouts.
The Supreme Court distinguished Dale from Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,163 where it held that Minnesota could require the
Jaycees to admit women because there was no evidence in the record
to show how the admission of women would impede the
organization's ability to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment or to disseminate its preferred views.
It also
distinguished Dale from Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte,1" where the Court held that a state antidiscrimination law
requiring women be admitted as members of a local Rotary Club did
not deny freedom of intimate association or freedom of expression to
the club. In Rotary Club of Duarte, the Court held that even if there
was a slight infringement on the club's expressive association, it was
justified by the "compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against women." 165
The Supreme Court further distinguished the Boy Scouts
organization from traditional places of public accommodation, such
as facilities like inns, trains, and restaurants. 166
These were
traditionally places where the public was invited. 167 Here, New
Jersey broadly defined the term "public accommodation" to cover
private membership organizations, which included non-commercial
expressive organizations that were unassociated with any physical
location. 168
The Fair Housing Act's exemption for religious organizations
and exclusion of commercial transactions from that exemption draws
a distinction similar to the distinction recognized by the Supreme
Court between traditional places of public accommodation, where
the court's have traditionally allowed antidiscrimination laws to
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 648.
Id
Id.
Id. at 653-54.
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
481 U.S. 537 (1987).
Id. at 549
Dale, 530 U.S. at 656.
Id.at 657.
Id.
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apply,'69 and the broader definition of public accommodations
adopted by New Jersey, which included associations that engage in
expressive activities. Religious organizations that are providing
housing as part of a commercial enterprise are not expressive
organizations. They are more analogous to persons who operate
inns or restaurants and who can be prohibited from refusing service
to persons protected by the public accommodation laws.
Justice Powell drew a similar distinction in his concurring
opinion in Runyon v. McCrary,7 ° where the Court interpreted the
reach of the Civil Rights Act of 1866' to forbid a private school
from discriminating on the basis of race in its admissions. Justice
Powell distinguished between a contract made by parents with a
private school to educate their children, which was covered by the
Act, and a contract made by parents with a tutor or babysitter,
which he termed a "personal contractual relationship" that he
believed was not covered by the Act.'72
Writing for the majority in Runyon, Justice Stewart expressly
recognized that the school was not a religious school and that it
raised no religious defense.'73 However, Justice Stewart rejected
arguments that applying the Civil Rights Act to the admissions
practices of private schools violated any right of association or any
privacy right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of
their children.' 74 His rejection of these associational and privacy
arguments effectively disposed of any defense based on religion as
well. Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment Division v. Smith
expressly held that restrictions on religious practice are accorded a
lower level of scrutiny by the courts than those that also involve
restrictions on speech or associational rights. 175
Thus, Congress drew the proper line between religious practice
and commercial activity in the Fair Housing Act. Congress left the
courts with the delicate task of applying the religious exemption to
individual cases. Their decisions will necessarily be informed by the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, but the lower

169. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84-88 (1980) (rejecting
private property owners' argument that they were being required to participate in
disseminating ideological messages that they might oppose); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259 (1964) (hotel owner "has no 'right' to select its guests as it sees
fit, free from government regulation").
170. 427 U.S. 160, 187 (1976). Previously in Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968), the Supreme Court had had no reservation about extending the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, to the private sales of homes.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
172. Supra note 170 at 187-88.
173. Id. at 167.
174. Id. at 175-79.
176. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
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courts should go no further than this jurisprudence requires in
applying the exemption.
4.
RELIGION
CONSCIENTIOUS

AS

A

DEFENSE

TO
DISCRIMINATION
OBJECTION

-

Religion may also be raised as a defense to a charge of
discrimination. What if the protected status of a housing resident
conflicts with the religious beliefs of a provider of private housing?
For instance, what if a couple wants to cohabit and cohabitation by
unmarried persons conflicts with the religious beliefs of their
landlord?'76
Clearly if the objection is based on what the Supreme Court
has found to be a suspect classification under the Constitution such
as race or gender, the government has a compelling justification to
override the convictions of the housing provider.'77 However, if the
discrimination is based on marital status, sexual orientation, or even
disability, the answer will be more complex, and lower courts have
differed on the outcome.
In Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University,'7 8 the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia held that the District of
Columbia, by placing sexual orientation discrimination in its human
rights ordinance along with race, color, religion, national origin, and
sex, had determined that "all forms of discrimination based on
anything other than individual merit are equally injurious to the
immediate victims and to society as a whole" and that the inclusion
was justified by "a compelling governmental interest."
Similarly in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing
Commission,'79 the Supreme Court of California held that religiously
motivated landlords in California could not discriminate against gays
when such discrimination is unlawful under state law. However, in
Attorney General v. Desilets,80 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
held that a landlord could validly object to renting to an unmarried
couple in violation of a state law forbidding discrimination on the
basis of marital status.
176. Discrimination based on marital status does not violate the federal Fair Housing
Act, but it may violate a number of state and local human rights laws and ordinances.
177. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) (race) and
Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (women).
178. 536 A.2d 1, 31-38 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This decision is consistent with Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), where the Supreme Court held that eliminating
gender discrimination was justified by a "compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against women," even though gender discrimination itself is subject to a less searching scrutiny
by the courts. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
179. 913 P.2d 909, 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 700 (1996).
180. 636 N.E.2d 233, 418 Mass. 316 (1994).
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In situations where the Supreme Court has not recognized
classes to be suspect under the Fourteenth Amendment, such as in
cases involving discrimination against unmarried couples or against
homosexuals, housing providers will argue that the government has
insufficient reason to intrude on their religious beliefs."8 ' On the
other hand, when housing providers have voluntarily entered the
commercial housing market, they should be required to comply with
the anti-discrimination laws that govern their businesses or leave the
market. 8 2 If they have religious scruples, they can invest their money
and talent in another business or profession. There is no right under
due process for any individual to engage in a particular business or
profession. 83
'
The outcome of any discussion of the free exercise clause will
depend on how closely the courts review the restriction. Justice
Scalia's opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 84 holding that the
rationality standard applies to laws that are neutral on their face
even when they restrict the practice of religion, has been widely
criticized." 5 Almost immediately after that decision, Congress, with
overwhelming bi-partisan support, passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), which required laws that substantially
burden the free exercise of religion to be justified by a compelling
governmental interest." 6
As discussed above, there is considerable debate as to whether
RFRA applies to federal legislation that restricts the practice of
religion and whether the newer amendments to RFRA in the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 200087 are
legal under the Spending and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.
If RFRA does not apply, there is the additional question of whether
state equivalents of RFRA that provide a higher protection to
religion than the Constitution, conflict with the Fair Housing Act
and are thus preempted. If they are not preempted, one can
legitimately argue that fair housing referrals by HUD to state or
local human rights agencies pursuant to Section 3610(0 are improper
because state requirements that provide for a broader review on the

181. For instance, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Supreme
Court held that Congress did not have power to authorize damage suits against State agencies
for discrimination against persons with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
182. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
183. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
184. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a spirited defense of
Justice Scalia's opinion, see, Hamilton, God v. the Gavel (2005).
185. Supra note 106.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I et seq. (2000).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I et seq. (2000). The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act was found not to violate the First Amendment by the Supreme Court. Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005).
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question of interference with religion are not substantially equivalent
to those under federal law. 88
Regardless of the proper standard of review, one can argue
that eliminating discrimination is a "compelling" governmental
objective and that the religious beliefs of housing providers who
decide to pursue an occupation in real estate are not a justification to
discriminate in violation of the fair housing laws.
B.

PROTECTING AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION

Trying to reconcile the Establishment Clause decisions of the
United States Supreme Court requires a great amount of finesse.
Whether there is indeed a wall of separation between Church and
State 89 has been subject to varying interpretations by the Justices.
Nonetheless there is no question that the government cannot support
distinctly religious activities however the Court chooses to define
them.
Although it may be motivated by a conviction founded on
religion, the activity of housing persons is not in itself a distinctly
religious activity. Therefore, there should be no problem under the
Establishment Clause for the government to give money to private
groups, whether religiously affiliated or secular, to develop
housing. 9 ° However, if the money was used directly to construct a
chapel or other place of worship for the residents, there would be a
problem.'9 1 Such a use of funds is expressly prohibited by the HUD
Faith-Based Initiatives directive. 192
188. See, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(0 (2000).
189. See, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
190. Cf., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (government support for religiously
operated hospitals is allowed).
191. Cf, Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (holding that
state funds could be given to private colleges, including those that are religiously affiliated,
subject to the restriction that the funds not be used for "sectarian purposes.").
Of course, with federal and state funding come restrictions. Whether organizations
want to meet these restrictions is a serious question that each organization must answer before
it becomes dependent on governmental subsidies. Compare, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980), (upholding the Hyde Amendment that prohibits Medicaid funds to be used to fund
abortions); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (prohibiting recipients of federal funds to
engage in abortion counseling services); National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 572 (1998) (National Endowment for the Arts can consider "general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public" as criteria for considering
grant applications); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (libraries that
receive federal funds must install software to block images that constitute obscenity or child
pornography and to prevent minors from obtaining access to material that is harmful to them);
with, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (public
university cannot decline to authorize disbursement of funds to finance the printing of a
Christian student newspaper when it funds other student publications); Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (Congress cannot restrict legal services lawyers from
representing clients in efforts to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare laws).
The
Charitable Choice provisions of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 604a, attempts to
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Creating regulatory exemptions for religiously affiliated
organizations will not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause.
Justice Stevens argued in his concurring opinion in City of Boerne v.
Flores,9 ' that the RFRA violated the Establishment Cause because:
"governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is
forbidden by the First Amendment. 19 4 However, no other justice
concurred with Justice Stevens.
In many instances, legislation that gives a special exemption to
religious organizations is not really establishing a preference; it is
simply accommodating the right of free exercise guaranteed by the
First Amendment. For instance, legislation exempting religiously
affiliated employers from the religious discrimination provisions of
Equal Employment Opportunity Act does not breach the
Establishment Clause.' 95 The Supreme Court stated in Corporation
of the PresidingBishop v. Amos'96 that:

This Court has long recognized that the government may (and
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it
may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.'

. .

. It

is well established, too, that 'the limits of permissible state
accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with
the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.'...
There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for
'benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to
exist without sponsorship and without interference,'. .

.

. At

some point accommodation may devolve into 'an unlawful
fostering of religion"97

lift some restrictions that have traditionally prevented government funding for those faithbased projects that are included in the Act. However, the Act still must be read in conformity
with the strictures of the First Amendment.
192. See, Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,712 (July
9, 2004). The Directive states that "HUD funds may be used for the acquisition, construction,
or rehabilitation of structures only to the extent that those structures are used for conducting
eligible activities under a HUD program or activity." Id. Sanctuaries, chapels, and other
rooms that a HUD-funded religious congregation uses as its principal place of worship are
ineligible for HUD-funded improvements. Id. However, "where a structure is used for both
eligible and inherently religious activities, HUD funds may not exceed the cost of those
portions of the acquisition, construction, or rehabilitation that are attributable to eligible
activities in accordance with the cost accounting requirements applicable to the HUD program
or activity." Id. This qualification could obviously be challenged in its application to
individual funding requests where it is shown that federal funds are being directed toward the
support of religious activities.
193. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
194. Id. at 537
195. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
Similarly, laws that recognize exemption from the military because of conscience do not violate
the Establishment Clause. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
196. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
197. Id.at 334.
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It can be argued that faith-based initiatives, which promote the
participation of religiously affiliated organizations in government
funded programs, move the fine line between neutrality and
government support of religion too far in favor of the latter.
However, whether faith-based initiatives violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment
will depend upon how each
1 98
individual initiative is structured.
HUD's Faith-Based Initiative directive is fairly fine-tuned, but
still presents some questions about how it might be implemented.
The HUD directive has been criticized for failing to provide
sufficient oversight mechanisms or "firewalls" to prevent religious
use of government funds. However, HUD has responded that:
"Inappropriate use of HUD funds or failure to comply with
HUD requirements is not a possibility that arises only when
program participants are faith-based organizations. Failure of
any organization receiving Federal funds to ensure that the
Federal portion of their funding is not used for prohibited
organization or the imposition of
purposes will subject the
99
'

sanctions or penalties."'

The directive provides that religiously affiliated organizations
are qualified to receive federal funding, and specifically refers to
housing programs for the elderly and persons with disabilities.
Federal monies may not be used to fund "inherently religious
198. Douglas Kauper observed almost a half century ago that:
"The overlapping of state and church functions in some respects and the necessity in
some situations of making a choice between the free exercise and the
nonestablishment limitations makes clear that many of the problems in this area are
too complicated to admit of solution by simply invoking some rigid principle of
separation of church and state."
Kauper, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY (1956) at 131.
The solution suggested by Kauper still rings true today:
"Both the free exercise and the nonestablishment principles combine to outlaw any
official church or religion of the state. All religious groups must be dealt with on an
equal basis. The liberty of dissenters and unbelievers must be protected. The state
may properly act to further religious interests or to promote general legislative
policies without the necessity of discriminating against religion, if in so doing it does
not grant a preference and does not act to coerce the conscience of others. To
appropriate money for churches even on a non-preferential basis too clearly violates
the nonestablishment principle to permit validation of the theory that the legislature
is promoting the free exercise of religion, since it is not the function of a state to
operate churches. On the other hand, financial assistance to auxiliary enterprises
that represent overlapping functions of church and state can be justified, since by
hypothesis no clear separation of function can be recognized."
Id. at 132-3.
199. Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,715.
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activities," which are defined as "worship, religious instruction, or
proselytization."
While this definition may not encompass all
activities that run afoul of the First Amendment, but it does not
appear on its face to be unduly vague or under inclusive.
The
directive also provides that participation in any activity must be
voluntary for beneficiaries of the programs.
Recent Supreme Court opinions hold that the government may
not exclude religious groups from programs that are generally open
to the public. In Board of Education v. Mergens, °° the Supreme
Court held that public school officials could not exclude a religious
club at a public school under the Equal Access Act.2"' The Court
held that the Equal Access Act did not violate the Establishment
Clause under the three-part test developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, °2
because it had a secular purpose, did not have a primary effect of
advancing religion, and did not involve the government in excessive
entanglement. The Act simply allowed religious groups the same
privileges afforded all other groups.
Similarly, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia,"3 the Supreme Court held that a University
that paid outside contractors for the printing costs of a variety of
student publications could not withhold authorization for payments
on behalf of a student paper that primarily advocated religious
beliefs. The Court stated that having government officials determine
which papers were religious and which were not unduly involved the
government in the entanglement of religion. °
Also, in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, °5
the Court held that it does not violate the Establishment Clause
when, pursuant to a religiously neutral state policy, the state permits
a private party to display an unattended religious symbol in a
traditional public forum located next to its capital building.
In a case upholding governmental aid for primary or secondary
education, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2 6 where the State of Ohio
offered tuition aid that is distributed directly to parents according to
financial need for students in both public and private schools,
whether religious or non religious, the Court found that the program
had a secular purpose and effect and was "entirely neutral with
'20 7
respect to religion.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

496 U.S. 226 (1990).
20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2000).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Id. at 845-46.
515 U.S. 753 (1995).
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
Id.at 662
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Cutter v. Wilkinson 08 clearly holds that a law passed by
Congress to accommodate religion does not automatically violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court upheld
that Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA) which prohibits states from imposing substantial burdens
on the exercise of religion by persons confined in an institution unless
they can be justified by "a compelling governmental interest." While
the Court acknowledged that "[a]t some point, accommodation may
devolve into 'an unlawful fostering of religion,"' RLUIPA did not,
on its face, "exceed the limits of permissible government
accommodation of religious practices. 229 The Court commented
that Congress had documented that "'frivolous or arbitrary' barriers
impeded institutionalized persons' religious exercise, ' 210 and found
that the law alleviated exceptional government-created burdens on
private religious exercise.2 1' The accommodation did not override
other significant interests,2 12 and the Court deferred to the States to
apply the law in a balanced and sensitive way.213 Finally, the Court
emphasized that the law did not differentiate among bona fide faiths.
No religious sect was elevated above any other sect.2t 4
When the government steps over the line and promotes or
endorses religious beliefs, it violates the Establishment Clause. In
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,"5 the Supreme
Court held that a display of a creche inside of a county building
violated the Establishment Clause, but that a display of a Chanukah
menorah outside the building next to a Christmas tree did not. The
Court acknowledged that:
Precisely because of the religious diversity that is our national
heritage, the Founders added to the Constitution a Bill of
Rights, the very first words of which declare: 'Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
208. 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005)
209. ld. at 2117.
210. Id. at 2119.
211. Id.at 2121.
212. Id. at 2122.
213. Id. at 2123.
214. Id.
215. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). Similarly, in McCreary County v. ACLU, the Supreme
Court held that two Kentucky counties violated the Establishment Clause when they displayed
copies of the Ten Commandments in their courthouses. 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005). The purpose of
the display was to promote religion and the Commandments were fully set out so that they
stood alone and not as part of an arguably secular display. Id. at 2738. However, in Van
Orden v. Perry, the Court upheld the display of the Ten Commandments on the lawn of the
Texas State Capital.
125 S.Ct. 2854 (2005).
The Court found that while the Ten
Commandments were undoubtedly religious, the nature of the display and the
Commandment's tie to our Nation's history were found under the particular circumstances of
that case to convey a predominantly secular message that did not breach the First Amendment.
Id. at 2864.

34

TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS [Vol. 11:1

prohibit the free exercise thereof....' Perhaps in the early days
of the Republic these words were understood to protect only
the diversity within Christianity, but today they are recognized
as guaranteeing religious liberty and equality to 'the infidel, the
atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam
or Judaism. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S., at 52. It is settled law
that no government official in this Nation may violate these
fundamental constitutional rights regarding matters of
conscience. Id., at 49.26
The Court concluded that:
'Whether the key word is 'endorsement,' 'favoritism,' or
'promotion,' the essential principle remains the same. The
Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious
belief or from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community. Lynch v.
217
Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).'
In Corporation of PresidingBishop v. Amos, 2 8 the Court held
that the religious exemption in Title VII did not breach the
Establishment Clause because it did not advance religion:
Undoubtedly, religious organizations are better able now to
advance their purposes than they were prior to the 1972
amendment to § 702. But religious groups have been better
able to advance their purposes on account of many laws that
pave passed constitutional muster: for example, the property
tax exemption at issue in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, [394 U.S. 664
(1970)], or the loans of school books to school children,
including parochial school students, upheld in Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236. . . (1968). A law is not
unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance
religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have
forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say the
government itself has advanced religion through its own
activities and influence. As the Court observed in Walz, 'for
the men who wrote the Religion Causes of the First
Amendment the establishment of a religion connoted
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
216. 492 U.S. at 589-590.
217. Id. at 593-94.
218. 483 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1987).
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sovereign in religious activity. 397 U.S., at 668,
Lemon, 403 U.S., at 612 ...

. .

. Accord,

What is significant in Amos is that the Supreme Court
specifically found that there was no evidence in the record that the
Title VII exemption gave the Church an advantage in propagating its
religious mission that it did not possess before, stating that:
[W]e find no persuasive evidence in the record before us that
the Church's ability to propagate its religious doctrine through
the Gymnasium is any greater now than it was prior to the
passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. In such circumstances,
we do not see how any advancement of religion achieved by the
Gymnasium can be fairly attributed to the Government, as
opposed to the Church. 9
HUD faith-based initiatives program involves direct public
subsidies to religious organizations, but these subsidies are to be kept
separate and apart from secular activities and not for religious
proselytism.2 0 It is unlikely under such circumstances that the Court
would assume an advantage to the religious mission of the
organization because of the receipt of the public funds alone.2 2
Therefore, to attack the program as a violation of the Establishment
Clause, actual proof would be required that the Government is
indeed advancing religion.
The Department does not fund religious organizations directly.
Faith-based groups are generally not-for-profit tax exempt
organizations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code.222 The organizations that receive funding cannot discriminate
in whom they serve. 23 This would suggest that the Department
219. Id.
220. Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,713.
221. The Supreme Court has held that while religiously affiliated organizations are not
disabled from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs, the government may
not fund "pervasively sectarian" institutions. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609-610 (1988)
(the Supreme Court upheld a federal grant program that provided funding for services relating
to adolescent sexuality and pregnancy to organizations with institutional ties to a religious
denomination, but emphasized that the institution was not "pervasively sectarian"). However,
a more recent decision questions this exclusion. In Mitchell v. Helms, a plurality opinion, the
Court upheld Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, under
which federal funds were distributed to states to lend educational materials directly to private
schools, including parochial schools. 530 U.S. 793, 825-29 (2000).
222. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
223.
The White House takes the position that faith-based groups have a
constitutionally-protected right to maintain their religious identity through hiring. See, e.g.,
This would exempt them
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/l2/20021212-6.html.
from Title VII's prohibitions on religious discrimination in hiring. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. See also
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) and the Charitable
Choice Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. 604a(f), which provides that: "a religious organization's
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applies the law neutrally. However, based on the fact that HUD
singles out faith-based groups and designates personnel to assist such
groups in their missions, a reasonable person could reach the
conclusion that faith-based groups are preferred. For instance, in the
Department's Notice of Funding Availability for Fiscal Year 2004,
extra points are awarded "if you are a grassroots faith-based or other
community-based organization, [or] propose to partner or subcontract with grassroots faith-based or other community-based
organizations. "224 This preference is included in its 2005 funding
request as well.225
In HUD funding notices, it is suggested that the reason for
singling out faith-based groups is to overcome past discrimination
against these groups.2 6 However, whether the government has a
"compelling
governmental
interest"
in
overcoming
past
discrimination against religious groups is discounted by two Supreme
22 held that
Court decisions. The first case, City of Boerne v. Flores,
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was unconstitutional as
applied to the states under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
because Congress did not have sufficient evidence of recent instances
where states had discriminated on the basis of religion.
Furthermore, a government may be justified in withholding funds
from activities that run a risk of creating an appearance that it is
favoring religion, even if the funding itself might not be in strict
violation of the Establishment Clause. The second case, Locke v.
Davey, 228 held that deference would be given to a state refusal to
fund a religious project in order to avoid the appearance of
supporting religion. These cases place a heavy burden on the
Department to justify overcoming past discrimination through an
executive-imposed, as opposed to a legislatively-imposed, faith-based
initiative program.
Affirmatively promoting faith-based initiatives also opens the
door to problems not only of decreased neutrality, but also of
governmental entanglement with religion. Determining what is or is
exemption provided under section 200e-a of this title regarding employment practices shall not
be affected by its participation in, or receipt of funds from, programs described in subsection
(a)(2) of this section."
224. See 69 Fed. Reg. -27,147 (May 14, 2004).
225. See 70 Fed. Reg. 13,567 (March 21, 2005).
226. In its 2005 NOFA, HUD stated that its final rule was issued "to remove barriers
to the participation of faith-based organizations in eight HUD programs." (Emphasis
supplied.) 70 Fed. Reg. 13,579 (March 21, 2005. In its discussion of the public comments to
the proposed HUD rule providing for equal participation of faith-based organizations, it was
stated that "HUD's general objective is to eliminate barriers to faith-based organizations, to
welcome their participation in HUD programs, and most important, to ensure they are treated
like other program participants. 69 Fed. Reg. 41,714 (July 9, 2004).
227. 512 U.S. 507 (1997).
228. 124 S.Ct. 1307 (2004).
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not a faith-based organization 29 and whether a faith-based
organization is using its funds for improper sectarian purposes 23 ° can
raise entanglement problems. 231 Whether neutral standards
applicable to all grantees and particular delicacy in administering
these programs can alleviate them is of utmost importance to those
who see the First Amendment as the bedrock of the American
experience.
III.

CONCLUSIONS

At first blush, the First Amendment would probably not win
many popularity contests today. A block of Justices on the Supreme
Court would give both the Establishment and the Free Exercise
Clauses a very narrow interpretation. Members of Congress, the
President, and state officials regularly speak out in favor of prayer in
the public schools, more public funding for religious organizations,
and greater tolerance for public displays of religious symbols. Public
officials do not win elections by urging a strict separation of Church
and State. Recent Supreme Court decisions reflect this public
mood2 32 and have raised heated public debates about the Court's role
229. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (holding that the courts
cannot inquire into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 307 (1940) (invalidating a state law that gave public officials the power to determine what
were religious causes because it was a censorship of religion). What is a religion is far from
clear. In Davis v. Beason, the Supreme Court states that the term religion references one's
views on his relationship to his Creator, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890); however, in Torcaso v.
Watkins, the Court recognized that a religious belief need not be equated with a belief in God.
367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). In construing the Selective Service Act, the Supreme Court held that
a religious belief was a "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor
a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption."
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Presumably there is nothing wrong with testing the sincerity of a person's religious beliefs.
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment
Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
230. Cf., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (The Court held that the Title I
program, which allowed public school teachers and guidance counselors to provide teaching
and counseling services in sectarian schools, did not unduly entangle the government with
religion because it did not require "pervasive monitoring by public authorities" to ensure that
public employees did not inculcate religion).
231. These problems can, however, be overcome through sensitive administration. In
Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court assumed that the law would be applied in an
appropriately balanced way. 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2123 (2005).
232. Justice Breyer acknowledged the role of public sentiment in his concurring
opinion in Van Orden v. Perry:
"But the Establishment Clause does not compel the government to purge from the
public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious .... Such absolutism is not
but would also tend to promote
only inconsistent with our national traditions ....
the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid." 125 S.Ct. 2854,
2868 (2004).
He concludes his opinion, which upholds the display of the Ten Commandments on the Texas
Capital Grounds, by stating that:
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in interpreting the Constitution. But on reflection, the First
Amendment religion clauses work. They ensure the effective
operation of our democratic system and explain why our pluralistic
society has avoided many of the religious conflicts that have engulfed
the rest of the world. It is my belief that America is one of the most
religiously diverse countries in the world, and this may be due, in
part, to the separation of Church and State.
The Fair Housing Act's promise of fair and equal housing for
all persons, and the First Amendment's promise of government
neutrality in matters of religion are not incompatible. We are a
nation of great diversity. Unfortunately our housing patterns do not
always reflect this fact. Proper enforcement of the Fair Housing
Act's promise of equal housing opportunity and of the First
Amendment's guarantee to protect the practice of religion without
the government establishing religion can help ensure that all persons
live comfortably together in our pluralist society and that all persons
have access to safe, decent, and sanitary housing where they can
exercise their right to worship or not to worship as they choose.

"This display has stood apparently uncontested for nearly two generations. This
experience helps us understand that as a practical matter of degree this display is
unlikely to prove divisive. And this matter of degree is, I believe, critical in a
borderline case such as this one... At the same time, to reach a contrary conclusion
here, based primarily upon the religious nature of the tablets' text would, I fear, lead
the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in our Establishment
Clause traditions. Such a holding might well encourage disputes concerning the
removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public
buildings across the nation. And it could thereby create the very kind of religiously
based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid." Id. at 2871.
It is a sad day when a Justice of the Supreme Court acknowledges that his decision was shaped
by which side is likely to yell the loudest. Decisions interpreting the First Amendment should
not by influenced by the shrill criticism of zealous "true believers" who would lower the wall of
separation between Church and State through intimidation and threats and not through the
persuasiveness of their arguments.

